Somalia: IED Threat Mitigation

16 DECEMBER 2021
1. “Explosive threat mitigation” support to AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), through UNSOS logistical support:
   - Five AU Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs)
     - 40 IED Disposal teams
     - 65 IED Route Search teams

2. “Training, equipment… and mentoring of the SSF to counter the threat of improvised explosive devices,” through UNSOS logistical support:
   1. Somalia National Army (SNA) IED Disposal teams (21 teams)
   2. Somalia Police Force (SPF) EOD and IED Disposal teams (18 teams)
**Incident Trends**

Since 2019 a decline in incidents has been recorded with a drop of 12% noted in 2020.

A continuation in the drop of incident numbers - based on current monthly trends - is also likely to be noted in 2021. However this drop in incidents should not be considered to be a result of any degrading of the AS IED network.

**Casualty Impact**

Highest casualty numbers by group are typically sustained by civilians.

While 2020 noted that SNA sustained the highest casualty numbers, so far in 2021 civilians have once again become the highest impacted group.

The drop in the impact of ‘VBIEDs’ and ‘Complex Attack – VBIED’ is noted when 2020 is compared to 2019. However, casualties in 2021 have noted an increase even though incident numbers are at present lower than 2020.
Response: Understanding the IED threat in a conflict environment

These are the building blocks of understanding the IED threat. Once this technical information is robust, specific training and equipment should be adjusted based on the threat. This information is equally as relevant for IED prevention or ‘Upstream’ activities to be more effective.
Power source: Motorcycle battery
Arming mechanism: Remote controlled
Switch: Victim Operated
Container: Directional Fragmentation

1. The IED threat is dynamic.
2. Conflict environments require a continuous cycle of analysis and lessons learned to adapt to the ever-changing IED threat.
3. Training implications
4. Equipment implications
In most cases, UNMAS is in a technical support or advisory role with IED prevention activities. Work in these areas requires broad collaboration with a range of stakeholders in Somalia and the region.
Why is technical and tactical analysis important?

Prior to 2017: Main Explosive Charge Harvested from ERW

Since 2017: Main Explosive Charge transitioned to HME

Charcoal-based HME

- Charcoal
- Potassium Nitrate
- Nitroglycerin

UNMAS
NEEDS DRIVEN. PEOPLE CENTRED.
### Examples of Prevention Activities in Somalia

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>✓ National Policy, Legislation, and Regulations</th>
<th>✓ Border Controls</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Draft Explosives Act for FGS – to control explosives and explosive precursors</td>
<td>• UNODC collaboration with IED components handbook for maritime interdiction operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Security and Control of Explosives</td>
<td>✓ Control of IED Precursors</td>
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<td>• WAM support to FGS to prevent diversion of explosives</td>
<td>• Arms Embargo – IED Components Ban</td>
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<td>• Mine / ERW clearance</td>
<td>• IED Components database</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ IED Risk Education</td>
<td>✓ Regional and International Cooperation and Information Sharing</td>
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<td>• IED Awareness training to security forces</td>
<td>• IGAD technical support with regional C-IED strategy</td>
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<td>✓ C-IED Capability Development</td>
<td>• AU information sharing on IED threat in Somalia</td>
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<td>• Technical solutions to IED switch that was initiated by standard metal detectors</td>
<td>• CAS C-IED Working Group</td>
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