

UNMAS Iraq Thematic briefing for the MASG 15 February 2018

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UNMAS Iraq Vision and Strategy

Vision:

'Enabling recovery and stabilization, enabling safe return'

Strategy:

The overall objective is to assist humanitarian and stabilization activities supporting the return of displaced people to areas recently liberated from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) occupation, specifically to:

- Provide Explosive Hazard Management response in support of humanitarian and stabilization efforts;
- 2. Deliver risk education at the community level and national/regional level; and
- 3. **Enhance** Government entities' **capacity** to manage, regulate and coordinate an EHM response.




Mosul Old City: A coordinated response

- <u>16 November:</u> **Mosul Old City Technical Planning** meeting attended by UNMAS, UNDP, UNHABITAT, UNESCO, UNEP, Shelter Cluster Members and Government officials.
 - Organizations presented their plans for the Old City.
 - Agreed on a plan outlining areas of responsibilities and collaboration for a coordinated approach to respond in the Old City.
 - UNMAS committed to coordinating partners to clear access routes and identify explosive hazard threat levels and provide advice to UN Agencies and Government of Iraq for planning purposes.
- 20 November: UNMAS started road/access clearance the Old City.
- January 2018: Additional team deployed to increase clearance capacities in the Old City.
- <u>February 2018</u>: **Additional capacity** including mechanical components mobilized for Mosul and Fallujah.
- Cash-for-Work monitors reported that no accidents have occurred so far and found or suspected items are reported to Police or UNMAS implementing partners.
 All Cash-for-Work workers have received risk education.

Mosul: Tasking

- The majority of tasks originate from the Funding Facility for Stabilization list, generated by UNDP and the Government of Iraq.
- Clearance of critical infrastructure in support of stabilization including hospitals, health centres, electrical power stations, water treatment plants, access roads, schools & Government infrastructure.









Mosul's Old City

- **Red dots:** severe infrastructure and housing damage.
- Yellow dots: infrastructure and housing damage.

Explosive contamination encountered:

- Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
- IED components
- Aerial bombs
- Rockets/missiles
- Mortar rounds
- Suicide vests/belts
- Hand grenades
- Air Dropped Improvised Munitions
- Fuses



Mosul: Operational capacity

Current capacity:

• 2 x high-risk search teams (12 x searchers/team + team leader)

Operational increase from March 2018:

- 2 x high-risk search teams
- Mechanical assets







Western Mosul Hospital Complex Al Shifa



The hospital complex was used as ISIL's HQ in West Mosul and as a result suffered severe damage during the battle for Mosul.

UNMAS intervention enabled the Ministry of Health to relocate vital hospital equipment to Al Khansa hospital in East Mosul to prevent looting. UNDP and Ministry of Health plan to fully rehabilitate the maternity section, burns unit, X-ray unit and the fertility centre within the complex.



To enable this, UNMAS' additional interventions will include delivering explosive hazards risk awareness training to 'cash for work' contractors who will clear and remove the rubble and provide an additional reporting mechanism. UNMAS provides advice and information in explosive hazards to UNDP's engineers so they can conduct their work at the hospital safely.



A day in Mosul – items found on 6 Feb. 2018

- 29 x suicide belts/vests
- 1 x magnetic attached claymore
- 5 x ISIL improvised hand grenades
- 4 x air dropped improvised munition
- 1 x IED main charge 10kg
- 2 x hand grenade
- 1 x grenade fuse
- 1 x guided missile warhead
- 1 x 8m detonating cord
- 1kg of ammonium nitrate aluminium powder
- 3kg pentaerythritol tetranitrate

- 54 x non-electric detonators
- 6 x electric detonators
- IED switch components:
- 23 x passive infrared systems/ switches
- 31 x high metal content pressure plates
- 126 x 5m lengths of crush wire switches
- 51 x pressure release switches
- 365 x radio-controlled packs/ switches
- 150,000+ miscellaneous electronic components used for construction of IEDs and IED radio-controlled circuit boards

- 2 x IEDs (1 x command wire initiated & 1 x radiocontrolled initiated)
- 3 x 40mm grenades
- 5 x hand grenades
- 71 x improvised grenades
- 1 x 115mm projectile
- 2 x 122mm projectiles
- 3 x 23mm projectiles
- 23 x 60mm mortars
- 1 x 120mm mortars
- 1 x smoke grenade
- 6 x tripwire switches







Mosul: Challenges

- An estimated 11 million tons of damaged construction material, rubble and debris.
- The sheer density, quantity, and complexity of explosive hazard contamination throughout the Old City.
- Human remains in parts of the Old City.
- Build up of stockpiles; Iraqi Security Forces explosive ordnance disposal and IED disposal capacity are having difficulties keeping up.
- Suspected improvised chemical ammunition with unknown chemical content.
- Access (checkpoints and documentation required).



Cash workers cleaning an alley of the Old City



Before rubble removal



After rubble removal



Mosul: Summary

- The scenario in Western Mosul has not previously been encountered in the Humanitarian Mine Action sector in terms of the type of contamination, density, complexity, variety and quantity.
- Urban survey and high-risk search and clearance requires highly specialized and qualified teams.
- Level of explosive hazard contamination in Eastern Mosul is comparatively much lower, but still considerable.
- "Inside-Out" approach, going straight to critical infrastructure tasks.
- Due to the levels of rubble and debris Western Mosul, and in particular the Old City, will have to be cleared "layer by layer" and a full overview cannot be achieved until much more rubble has been removed (projected estimates).
- As more people return, there will continue to be an increase in explosive hazards moved and placed in streets. Risk education teams will continuously be engaged.
- Iraqi Security Forces stockpile disposal backlog.
- Support from the Government of Iraq and the international community is needed to continue to create conditions to increase the number of civilian operators, permitting for accelerated clearance in liberated areas. Training and resources are also required to support the Iraqi Security Forces to deal with the exponentially growing stockpiles of explosive hazards.

Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention


Between 18-21 December, the 16th Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention was held in Vienna, Austria.

DMA had submitted an extension request for Iraq, which was presented during the forum and Iraq was subsequently granted an extension until 1 February 2028.

It was noted that, even with a consistent and sizeable effort undertaken by Iraq starting before the entry into force of the Convention, Iraq faces a significant challenge in order to fulfil its obligations under the convention.

Prior to the Vienna conference, DMA launched their "National Strategy and Executive plan for Mine Action 2017-2021".







Questions?

